Israel invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiations. This information was confirmed by diplomatic sources and representatives of the Ukrainian embassy. The main topic is the possible assistance of Ukraine in intercepting Iranian drones, which have become a key element of the war in the Middle East.
The request itself seems logical: Ukraine has accumulated unique experience in combating drones, especially of Iranian origin. However, in Kyiv, a more complex question inevitably arises — how much such assistance aligns with Ukraine’s strategic interests.
This is the question that security experts, diplomats, and analysts, including the audience of Israeli media, are actively discussing today.
The historical context of Kyiv and Jerusalem relations after 2022
Before discussing the benefits or risks for Ukraine, it is important to recall how the relations between the two countries have developed since the start of the full-scale war.
Several key episodes of recent years
May 2022. Israel blocks the American transfer of Spike anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. The formal reason is the unwillingness to complicate relations with Moscow in Syria.
October 2022. Then Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov is denied a phone conversation with the Israeli leadership for the fifth time. The refusal was explained by threats from Dmitry Medvedev.
January 2023. Israel rejects a US request to transfer decommissioned HAWK interceptor missiles to Ukraine, which could significantly strengthen Ukrainian air defense.
June 2023. The Ukrainian ambassador to Israel publicly stated that the Israeli government chose the path of close cooperation with the Russian Federation. The reason was Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement about the risk of weapons supplied to Ukraine falling into the hands of Israel’s enemies, including Iran.
October 2023. Israel rejected Kyiv’s offer to work together on intercepting Iranian drones.
October 2023. Zelensky’s visit to Israel did not take place. Officially, it was explained by the busyness of the Israeli side.
January 2024. Israel blocked the evacuation of 29 Ukrainian citizens from the Gaza Strip for a long time.
January 2025. The Israeli ambassador stated that his country does not provide military assistance to Ukraine to avoid spoiling relations with the Kremlin — despite Russia simultaneously supplying weapons to Hamas.
At the same time, Israel did provide Ukraine with certain support — mainly non-lethal in nature. For example, early warning systems for missile strikes. But almost always such decisions were made under US pressure.
That is why today the question “is it beneficial for Ukraine to help Israel” is being discussed not only in Kyiv but also in Israeli society.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency regularly analyzes this complex geopolitical link, as the conflict between Israel and Iran directly affects the war of Russia against Ukraine.
Why Israel turned to Ukraine right now
Jerusalem’s request coincided with a new phase of the war against Iran. According to military sources, Israel faced a shortage of interceptor missiles to combat drones and cruise missiles.
This means that the Israeli air defense system is forced to operate at the limit of its capabilities.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has become one of the most experienced countries in the world in combating Iranian Shahed-type drones over the past few years. Ukrainian military developed a whole range of solutions — from software detection algorithms to tactical interception schemes.
Therefore, for Israel, Ukrainian experience represents real value.
However, from Kyiv’s point of view, the situation looks much more complicated.
The main risk for Ukraine — the economy of war
Any prolonged war in the Middle East directly affects the global oil market.
This is the key factor for Ukraine.
Every two weeks, high oil prices bring additional income to the Kremlin — according to economists’ estimates, approximately 1.5–2 billion dollars. This money is then converted into weapons, with which Russia continues the war against Ukraine.
If the Israeli operation against Iran drags on, it could enhance the Kremlin’s financial capabilities.
And that means — indirectly increasing pressure on the Ukrainian front.
That is why some Ukrainian analysts believe that excessive support for Israel in the current situation may play against Ukraine’s interests.
Additional risks discussed in the expert community
In addition to the economic factor, there are several other strategic risks.
Possible loss of technological advantage
Ukraine today possesses unique solutions in the field of countering drones. Israel, with its powerful military-industrial complex, is capable of quickly scaling any received technologies.
This means that after some time, Ukrainian development may turn into an Israeli export product, which will push Ukraine out of the defense technology market.
Risk of technology leakage
Israel previously explained its refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine by fearing that technologies could fall into the hands of Iran through Russia.
But a similar risk exists in the opposite direction. Any technologies transferred within the framework of cooperation could potentially become the object of intelligence struggle.
Political factor
In Israel, new elections are expected in 2026.
For Benjamin Netanyahu, a successful military operation against Iran could become an important political factor. Some analysts believe that a protracted conflict could strengthen the positions of the current government.
At the same time, the Israeli prime minister traditionally maintained working relations with Moscow and actively interacted with Donald Trump.
For part of the Ukrainian political class, this raises doubts about how much Israel can be considered a strategic ally.
What compromise is possible
Despite the listed risks, Ukraine cannot completely ignore Israel’s request.
Jerusalem still provided humanitarian support to Ukraine, and cooperation between the countries in the field of security is gradually developing.
Therefore, the most discussed option today is considered a limited form of assistance.
This may involve sending Ukrainian specialists and consultants who will share their experience in combating Iranian drones — without transferring weapons and key technologies.
At the same time, many experts in Kyiv consider it an important political condition:
Israel must publicly recognize and condemn the Kremlin’s role in supporting Iran, including the transfer of intelligence and the modernization of Shahed drones.
Only in this case can cooperation become mutually beneficial, rather than one-sided.
It is this balance — between strategy, the economy of war, and diplomacy — that today determines the main question:
should Ukraine really “pick up the phone from Israel”.