Iran has for the first time so directly included Ukraine in its public military rhetoric amid the current war in the Middle East. The head of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Ebrahim Azizi, stated on March 14, 2024, that Ukraine allegedly became a “legitimate target” for Tehran due to “supporting Israel with drones” and referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter. This statement is significant in itself: Tehran is no longer limited to threats against Israel, the US, or Arab neighbors, but is beginning to expand the list of external adversaries.
“By supporting the Israeli regime with drones, the failed Ukraine has effectively become involved in this war and, according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, has turned its entire territory into a legitimate target for Iran,” — he wrote on X.
But if you remove the Iranian propaganda shell, the picture looks more precise and interesting. There is no confirmed data in open sources that Ukraine officially supplies drones specifically to Israel. However, it is publicly confirmed that Kyiv has already sent teams of specialists to Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia to help them repel Iranian air attacks.
So the real nerve of the story is not that Ukraine is proven to supply Israel with drones, but that the Ukrainian experience of fighting Shahed is already turning into an exportable system of knowledge, technology, and practice for the Middle East. For Iran, this is dangerous in itself. Ukraine became the first country that for years, in a mode of almost daily warfare, learned to shoot down Iranian drones en masse, cheaply, and quickly. Now others are beginning to request this experience. That is why Tehran is nervous.
What is known about Ukraine’s assistance to the Middle East
Zelensky publicly stated that Ukraine sent three professional teams of experts to the Middle East. According to him, the first three countries are Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. This means that the Gulf countries are seeking Ukrainian experience specifically in combating Iranian air attacks.
It was also reported about assistance through the US. In early March, Zelensky said that Ukraine received a request from Washington for assistance in defending against Shahed in the Middle East. It was also reported that Ukraine sent specialists and interceptors to protect American bases in Jordan. Even if we set aside specific routes and volumes, the overall conclusion is already clear: Ukrainian anti-drone competence has begun to work not only on the Ukrainian theater of war.
This is the real context of Azizi’s statement. Iran is trying to present the matter as if it is already about Ukraine’s direct involvement in the war against the Islamic Republic. But according to the available facts, Kyiv is helping to repel Iranian drone threats in the region, not launching an armed attack on Iran. The difference between these two things is colossal — both politically and legally.
Why Iran’s reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter looks weak
Article 51 of the UN Charter does indeed exist, and it indeed enshrines the right of a state to individual or collective self-defense. But the key condition is formulated extremely clearly: such a right arises if an armed attack has occurred. Moreover, self-defense measures must be immediately reported to the UN Security Council. The text of the article does not contain a formula by which any assistance to an adversary automatically turns the assisting country into a “legitimate target.”
This is where Iranian rhetoric begins to fall apart. Azizi uses the real article number but invests it with much broader content than it contains. The statement in the spirit of “the entire territory of Ukraine has become a legitimate target” is not a legally accurate reference to the UN Charter, but a political threat wrapped in pseudo-legal packaging. Simultaneously, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other countries.
In other words, the news here is twofold. First: Iran is indeed threatening. Second: its attempt to justify this threat with Article 51 looks very weak. Kyiv can help other states fight Shahed, and this does not yet turn Ukraine into a legitimate target from the point of view of international law.
What distances and missiles say: where the threat is real, and where the media have already exaggerated
Geography here is as important as law. In a straight line from Tehran to Kyiv — approximately 2346 km. For comparison, from Tehran to Jerusalem — about 1560 km, and to Tel Aviv — about 1591 km. So at the level of capitals, Ukraine is noticeably farther than Israel.
If we take not the capitals but the shortest distance between territories, the gap is already smaller. The shortest distance between Iran and Israel is estimated at about 893 km. For the Iran–Ukraine pair, there are, for example, distances of about 1741 km to Luhansk and about 1983 km to Kherson. This is important because, in a strategic sense, Ukraine is not beyond the conceivable missile reach of Iran, but the assertion that “any point in Ukraine” is already guaranteed to be covered by the standard 2000 km is too broad.
According to open profile assessments, the Iranian Sejjil belongs to systems with a range of about 2000 km, and Khorramshahr to the class of missiles with a range of 2000 km, with one of the later versions featuring a potential of up to 3000 km. This changes the threat assessment. At a range of about 2000 km, it is more realistic to talk about the risk for parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, not for the entire country. But if we consider more long-range versions of Khorramshahr, the picture becomes heavier.
That is why the thesis of some media that the Khorramshahr and Sejjil missiles with a range of 2000 km are capable of hitting any point in Ukraine needs clarification. In this form, it is too broad. Kyiv, at a distance of about 2346 km, falls beyond the usual 2000-kilometer threshold, as do parts of the northern and central regions of the country. But the east and part of the south of Ukraine do indeed fall into the danger zone already at such a range. And if we are talking about a more long-range version of Khorramshahr, then the picture for the whole of Ukraine becomes much more alarming.
This is the important conclusion. The Iranian threat does not look like a pure bluff. It does not necessarily mean that a strike on Kyiv will follow tomorrow, but it can no longer be dismissed as completely unrealistic. Tehran has systems that, under certain scenarios, make part of Ukrainian territory reachable, and with more long-range options, expand this threat contour altogether.
For Israel, this story is also important. Because the threat to Ukraine in this case is not only a blow against Kyiv. It is also a warning to everyone who wants to integrate Ukrainian anti-drone experience into the region’s defense. This is what is increasingly being discussed in both the Israeli and Ukrainian agendas, and NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context records an important shift: Ukraine is ceasing to be only a victim of the Iranian-Russian drone war and is gradually becoming one of the sources of practical solutions for the Middle East.
Iran shows: it perceives Ukraine not just as a victim of Russian use of Shahed, but as a source of solutions dangerous to itself. And this, perhaps, is the main meaning of the whole story.